Telling people to watch for fraud does not explain why the illegal access ran for days, which CPR product was used, what monitoring saw, whose data was stolen or what changed before private access was restored. Those answers should already exist in logs, billing records, access-control configuration, contracts, incident tickets and formal risk records.
Which private company was it, and on what basis are authorities withholding its identity from the public?
Which CPR product and interface were used for the illegal activity?
Which credential or identity was used, and was it compromised, stolen or misused?
What were the exact start and end timestamps, and when did the first anomaly appear?
Reporting now puts the company account above 14 million lookup attempts. What is the exact total, including failed and zero-result lookups?
How many unique people were returned, and which fields were returned through each product path?
What was this customer's normal request baseline, what peak was reached, and how far did the activity deviate from normal?
Which rate limits, quotas, anti-enumeration controls and automatic suspension rules existed on the route that was abused?
DI Digital says automatic alarms and spot checks did not expose the abuse. What did those controls show during the ten days, which alerts fired, who saw them and why did none stop the access?
Why did a bill expose the abuse before the security controls did, and which control was supposed to catch this volume first?
Can every affected person obtain an incident-specific record showing whether their CPR number was queried and what data was returned?
Were CPR numbers belonging to people with name and address protection accessed even though their protected names and addresses were excluded?
What legal and risk assessment supports the chosen method of informing affected people under GDPR Article 34?
What Datatilsynet inspections, audits or supervisory actions before the breach covered private-company CPR access, high-volume automated lookups, anomaly detection or the audit trails CPR itself requires?
Which concrete controls were changed, tested and approved before private-company CPR access was restored at 11:57 on 5 October?